WALL vs. THE ROYAL SAXON.

the Court of Admiralty, proceeding under a peculiar and independent
system of law; just as trusts and equitable rights are the creatures
of the Court of Chancery. The question then comes to this:
whether the doctrines of the Court of Admiralty had. been grafted
upon the common law of Pennsylvania prior to the adoption of the
Constitution; and if this be so, still whether the Constitution has not
made the jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States, in this
respect, exclusive, by declaring that their judicial power" shall
extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."' For
the resolution of these points we must refer to the opinions themselves. It is understood that the case will be eventually carried'to
the Supreme Court of the United States.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

District Court of the United &ates, for te -EasternDistrict of

Pennsylvania,
WALL VS. THE BRITISH BARQUE, ROYAL' SAXON

.

A vessel may be libelled and sold in a Court of Admiralty, under a paramount lien,
such as for seamen's wages, notwithstanding that she has been previously seiz d
by process of foreign attachment issuing out of a State Court, and still remains
in the custody of the Sheriff; and a perfect title will pass to the Marshal's vendee.

Libel in Admiralty in a cause of wages. Petition for an interlocutory order of sale.
The facts of the case appear in the opinion of the Court; Feb. 4,
1848.
KANE, J.-The British Barque, Royal Saxon, being under'attachment in the Admiralty, for mariners' wages and supplies; the
master, with the approval of the consul of his nation, has applied to
the Court for an interlocutory order of sale. The facts, as reported
by the commissioner, show that such an order is called for by the
interests of all parties, and that .according to the ordinary course
of the Admiralty, it should be granted without delay.
'See Martin vs. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 885.
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The application is resisted by third persons, suitors in one of the
Courts of Pennsylvania, at whose instance the vessel was attached
under mesne process against certain non-resident defendants, before
she was arrested by the Marshal. They have presented two questions for the consideration of this Court: 1. Whether, pending such
attachment from the State Court, the.vessel was liable to arrest, and
is now liable to interlocutory order in the Admiralty; 2. Whether,
admitting such liability to exist, this Court ought under the circumstances to enforce it. I shall consider the questions together; for
they resolve themselves into one.
The authority of the Courts of Admiralty to make. seizure and
sale of vessels, while under attachment from the Courts of Common
Law, has not hitherto been questioned in England or this country.
On the contrary, it has been exercised in England, without prohibition or dispute; and in the Courts of the United States, it has been
asserted, and acted on, as often as occasion has offered. The cases
of The Flora,1 Hagg. 298; Ihe ,Spartan,Ware, 147; and of Certain
Zog8 of mahogany, 2 Sumn. 592-3; are illustrations of this.
The case in Haggard is interesting, as it shows at least the tacit
recognition of this admiralty power by the Commoii .law Courts.
An execution had been levied on the ship from the King's Bench,
before the attachment from the Admiralty. A sale was had under an
admiralty decree, and the proceeds were brought in and distributed,
so far as the claimants in that Court had right. The question then
arose, to whom should the surplus proceeds be paid over. The
Sheriff applied to the King's Bench for a rule on the Marshal to
pay them over to him; but was refused, on the ground that the Marshal had acted under competent authority, and that he would not
be bound to obey if ruled. The judgment creditor and the defendant in execution thereupon applied severally to the admiralty, each
claiming the surplus. A decretal orderpro formd was made in favor
of the defendant; and thereupon the whole matter was carried up
by appeal to the Court of Delegates, comprising Judges of the
King's Bench; Commou Pleas and Exchequer, as well as those of
the Civil Law Courts. It was admitted in argument before the
delegates, that the Sheriff's possession was suspended by th&admi-
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ralty process ;-but on the ground, as it would seem, that, though
suspended, it was not abandoned, and that the Sheriff's rights still
continued as against the owner, the Court directed that the surplus
proceeds remaining in the admiralty, after satisfying, the claims in
that- Court, should be .paid to the Sheriff: and the decision thus
given was satisfactory to Lord Eldon, who, as Chancellor, refused a
commission of review. In this whole case there does not appear,
either on the arguments- of counsel or the judgments rendered by
the several Courts, the suggestion of a doubt as to the regularity
of the proceedings of attachment and sale in the admiralty, though
both followed the sheriff's levy.
The case of the Spartan presented the question under circumstances almost identical with the case before me. The vessel -had
been attached in the State Court of Maine by sundry cieditors,
before the libel in the admiralty, which was for wages, as in our
case. The master, ,by his answer, admitted the wages to be due;
but the right of the libellants to proceed was resisted by the sheriff,
on behalf of the attaching creditors. The Court maintained the
regularity of the proceeding in admiralty. "1The property,!', said
Judge Ware, whose accuracy of learning makes him a safe guide,
(p. 147,) "the property has been attached by sundry creditors of
the charterers, and the cases are now pending in the State Courts.
It is argued, that as different creditors are each pursuing their own
right against this property in different Courts, it is a proper rule,
to prevent collision of judicial authority, to give precedence to those
who first lay their hands on the fund. This priority might be
decisive, if both creditors stood in the same relation to this specific
property. But The reason no longer holds, when the claim of -one
of the parties is in its -nature a privileged claim. The very essence
of a privilege is to give the creditor a preference over tho general
creditors of the debtor; and if such be the claim of the seamen, the
attachment only created a lien on" the property, subject to such
prior incumbrance. It can only extend -to the whole right to the
owner; and that was, to hold the property after discharging the
lien."
The same law.is asserted by Judge Story, in the case in 2 Sumner.
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,It was that of a replevin from a State Court, issued and served
before the Marshal's attachment in rem. "A suit in a State Court,"
said Judge Story, "by replevin, or by an attachment under process,
of the property, can. never be admitted to supersede the right of a
Court of Admiralty to proceed by a suit in rem- to enforce a right
.against that property to whomsoever it may belong. The admiralty
suit does not. attempt to enter into any conflict with the State Court,
-as-to the just operation of its process; but it merely asserts a paramount right against all persons whatever, whether claiming above
or under that process. No doubt can exist, that a ship may be
seized under admiralty process for a forfeiture, notwithstanding a
prior replevin or attachment of the ship then pending.. The same
thing is true as to the lien on a ship for seamen's wages; or on a
bottomry bond." 2 Sumn. 593.
These cases leave me 'without any doubt as to what the law is, or
what are the grounds on which it rests.
The proceeding in the Courts of the State applies itself to alleged
interests in the vessel, not to the vessel itself. The plaintiff in
replevin recovers his property, whatever it may be; but no more:
his title is not disencumbered by the execution which follows on his
judgmnent. The attachment creditor, if he succeeds in his suit,
obtains recourse against the thing attached, just so far as his
defendant had intbrest in it, and no farther. The rights of third
parties remain in 'both cases unaffected. The bona fide owner of
the property may sue out his process, and recover the possession
against the Sheriff's vendee, as if no replevin or attachment had
issued. The bottomry creditor, residing, it may be, in a foreign
country, is no party to either proceeding, and loses none of his
rights; his contract was with the thing, not the owner, and it is,
therefore, not embarrassed, and cannot be, by any question or
contest of ownership. So, too, the seamen: whoever owns the
vessel, or how often soever the ownership maybe changed; wherever
she may go, whatever may befal her; so long as a plank remains of
her hull, the seamen are her first cieditors, and she is privileged
to them for their wages. It is the interest of the individual
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defendant, his residuary interest after all these are satisfied, upon
which alone the common law process operates.
Nor would the case be different if the sheriff's sale had been made
under an interlocutory order. I am not aware that a court of common law can adjudicate upon rights that are not before it, or that
the sheriff can sell what never passed into his custody. What
rights were, or could be, involved in the proceeding by foreign attachment ?-those of the defendant in the writ; surely none else:
the command of the writ was to "attach the goods and effects of
the defendant" only. And what was it that passed into the Sheriff's
keeping? Tbe Act of Assembly of Pennsylvania tells us that it
was "the goods tnd effects of the defendant, susceptible of seizure
and manual occupation," and nothing more. See the Act of 1836,
§50. How, then, could the sheriff take or sell the title of-,a third
person ?
Should a foreigner present himself to-morrow, or a year hence, in
the State Court, and show there that from the first, and at all times,
he had been and was the only owner of the Royal Saxon, and that
the defendant, as whose property she was attached, never had a
scintilla of interest in her, would that CQurt refuse to him its judgment in replevin? "I was no paity," he would say, "to the proceeding under which MY ship was sold; I had no notice of. it; -neither my title, nor any liability of mine; or of my property, was asserted to be in issue ; the whole controversy was between strangers."
And if the Sheriffs vendee, in reply, were to assert hiatitle under
the judicial sale, would he not be told at once, in the language of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Freeman vs. Caldwell, 10
Watts, 9, "In judicial sales there. is no warranty, whether the sale
be of land or of a chattel pure. What interest in it does the: Sheriff
propose to sell ? Not a tftle to it; but the defendant's property in
it, whatever it may be."
Not so in the admiralty. Here, the subject matter of the controversy is the res itself. It passes into the custody of the Court.
All the world are parties; and the decree concludes all outstan.ding
interests, because all are represented. Here, they are marshaled
in their order of-title or privilege ; and if there be conflicting claims
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either upon the distributable fund, or upon the residue, the Court
adjudicates between them, or refers the question to that forum,
either at home, or in foreign countries, which is most competent to
examine it. It is an international court: its seal is recognized
every where; and its decrees are executed wherever, throughout the
world, there is a court of admiralty to appeal to. Its forms of proceeding are known among all maritime nations, and the title which
passes under them is absolute, without conditions, discharged of all
liabilities and liens. (See the Ship Thomas, Bee, 86.)
There is, therefore, as it seems to me, no difficulty in allowing an
arrest by the admiralty, notwithstanding the vessel, or some interest
in it, has passed before into the. custody of the Sheriff. His process, whether mesne or final, has affected only the rights which were
litigant in the Common Law Court; and those rights, whatever they.
were, are necessarily subordinate to those which give the admiralty
its jurisdiction. He retains all his rights, notwithstanding the
marshal's intervention. If he holds an execution, he may go on
with his sale; and his vendee will succeed to whatever title belonged
to the defendant. The proceedings against the vessel, the thing,
the subject of the property or title, may still go on in the admiralty: the Sheriff's vendee of the ship may intervene there, as the
defendant might have done in this Court; he may make defence to
the proceeding there, as the successor to the defendant's rights';
and may be substituted ultimately before the judge of admiralty,
as a claimant of the surplus fund. Or, if the Sheriff have not
sold before the proceedings in admiralty are consummated, the
sheriff may perhaps arrest the surplus proceedings in the admiralty,
-as was done in the case cited from 1 Haggard.
On the other hand; to deny to the admiralty the right of proceeding, because proceedings are pending elsewhere that affect the
title of the ship, or rights under the title, would be effedtively to
take from this court its characteristic and most wholesome office.
The Acts of Congress, following in this the maritime policy of the
rest of the world, give summary redress in cases of subtraction of
wages. Within three weeks, at furthest, from the exhibition of a
libel in the admiralty, the seaman has his decree; and in one week
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more, decree or no decree, he has probably sailed on another voyage.
To turn him over to a State Court, to await there the protracted
determination of a common law suit, to which he is not a party,
and of which he knows 'nothing, would be little else. than to deny
him justice altogether. It waf well .said by Lora-Stowell, in a suit
in personam for wages, against an a8serted owner, -when called
upon by the defendant not to decide the question of ownership, inasmuch as that question was already under adjudication in the High
Court of Chancery; "Shall I put him off to the distant day when
these conflicting interests may, after the diligence which the judge
of that court himself uses, or cbmpels parties 6 use, finally be arranged? The obstacles may outlive the suitor."
MLrs
S. Jokan,
1 Hagg. 341.
-Besides, may it not be questioned whether the State Courts could
regard the. seaman's claim? Suppose the foreign attachment dissolved by tie entry of bail, what becomes of the seaman's lien ? the
bail, whether for the defendant's appearance, or for the -satisfaction
of the judgment, is liable to the plaintiff only, aud for only his
asserted demand in the suit. The bail could not be charged for
seaman's wages -or other maritime liabilities of the thing attached:
"cnon hmeo in federa." Or, suppose the attachment not to be dissolved, but the cause to be prosecuted to final judgmefit and &.sale
made undei the execution: what will that execution affect ? It was

against the defendant, not the ship; and a sale under it can pass
no more and no better title than the defendant had. The proceeds
of the sale take the place of his residuayinterest in the thing sold,
and are not liable for the liens which were paramount to his title.
How then can the seaman assert his privilege against the proceeds
-of an execution in a common law suit?
View the subject as wd may; while we admit the inconvenience
or at least the delicacy, which attends the- exercise of a divided
jurisdiction, there can be no aoubt-as to the relative inconvenience
of asserting, or of waiving such a jurisdidtion as the admiralty has
over a case like this. But how can I waive it, were-I so inclined?
The powers of the Court are the property of the suitor; and the
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judge is nothing but the trustee, whom the constitution and the law
have constituted to exercise them when the occasion requires.
I may add in conclusion, that the question which this case presents is by no means -similar to those which were before the Court
in the cases cited by the counsel for the attaching creditors, (Mr.
Meredith.) Prince vs. )3artlett, in 8 Cra. 431: Hogan vs. Lucas,
in 10 Pet. 400; and Beaston vs. i" Parmners' Bank, in 12 Pet.
102, were all of them cases in which the subject of execution was
the same in both Courts whose process was in question, and where
the same law would determine the distribution of the proceeds, and
with equal security to the rights of all parties. A similar remark
may be made upon the case of the Bobert Fulton, 1 Paine, 620,
which at first view might -seem to conflict with some of the conclusions to which.I have arrived. It was the case of a libel for materials against a domestic ship in the admiralty, while n similar libel,
also for materials, was pending against the same ship in a State
Court. Both Courts derived their jurisdiction from the same local
law; and the Circuit Court of thb United States yielded up jurisdiction to the State Court, as the tribunal first taking possession of
the thing. The ground of the decision is thus expressed by Judge
Thompson: "The proceedings were in rem; and thesefitence must
act upon the thing itself, and could not be executed unless possession
of the thing was taken. It is the necessary result, he adds, of proceedings in rem, that the thing must be in the possession of the
Court ;" and he justly concludes that this possession must of course
be exclusive. Thus stating the case before Judge Thompson, I need
not spend time in distinguishing it from that now before this Court.'
I It would be a mistake of definition to include foreign attachments and replevins
in the same category with admiralty proceedings in rem. The Court of Admiralty
proceeds in rem, because its suitor has the jus in re, whether it bea priilegium or
other modification of ownership: its writ, in imch case, is irrespective of the person: the thing is defendant. The Common Law suitor, on the other hand, has only
the jus ad rem, a right of recourse against the thing, not of property in it; and according to the Civil Law, from which these terms are derived, his proceeding is in
personam, even when it begins by arresting the defendant's goods, and is followed
by a sale of them. See Bonjean, Mr. Act, 274, 4-c. The missio inyossionem
bonorum, which resembled the English writs' of attachment more than any other
process of the Civil Law, was never counted among proceedings in rein: it was applicable topersonaland mixed actions only.
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No one can be more anxiously sensitive than I am to the duty df
avoiding a contest of jurisdiction between a Court of the United
States and a State Court; and certainly there is no one, who can
regard with more deferential respect the Court under whose process
the Sheriff is understood to be acting, or who can be more fully
assured of the safety of every interest which may be confided to its
judicial administration. But I see no possibility of collision here;
and I am not aware that justice can possibly be done to the parties
who are now before me in this Court, unless the jurisdiction of this
Court is maintained.
Inasmuch, therefore, as it appears to the Court, that the British
Barque Royal Saxon, now under arrest and in the custody of the
Marshal of the.United States, is in a perishing condition, and that
there are no means-of effecting her discharge; it is upon the.petition
of the master of the said vessel, sanctioned and approved by the
Consular representative of Her Britannic Majesty, ordered:
. That the said vessel, her tackle, apparel, and furniture, be sold
by the Marshal of the United States for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, to the highest and best bidder; .the said Marshal
giving at least seven days' notice, by hand-bills publicly pbsted
and by advertisement in daily newspapers, and in the Legal Intelligencer, a weekly paper i of the time and place of such sale ;.and
that he briig the proceeds thereof into the Registry of this Court,
to abide further'order and decree.

In pursuance of this decree the Barque Royal Saxon was sold on
the 22d of February, 1848, to Robert Taylor. The parties to the
foreign attachment in.the State Court, had, however, in the'meantime, proceeded in their suits and obtained an order of sale of 1he
vessel therein as a perishable commodity, under the Act of 13th
June, 1836: and she was accordingly sold on the 21st of February,
1846, to a firm of the name of Ward & Co. The latter thereupon
brought an-action of replevin against Taylor, the Marshal's vendee,
under which the Royal Saxon was taken from his possession by the
Sheriff, and delivered to them.
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This replevin of Ward & Co. came on subsequently to be tried at
N si Prius, before Judge Woodward, of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The following is the report of his charge:

Supreme Court of Penn8ylvania, at Nii Prius.
NATHAN T. CARRYL, WHO SURVIVED WM. J. WARD, LATE COPARTNERS
UNDER THE FIRM OF WARD AND CO., VS. ROBERT TAYLOR.

1. A vessel seized, under process of foreign attachment in a State Codrt, was subsequently libelled in Admiralty for seamen!s wages, and attached by the Marshal,
while still in tho custody of the Shariff. The vessel was sold as perishable inboth.
proceedings. Ruled, that as the common law jurisdiction had first attached, the
title of the Sheriff's vendee was superior, to that of the vendee of the Marsha .
2. t seem that maritime liens, such as for seamen's wages, are discharged by a sale
on execution in Pe.nsylvana and that the claimants are turned over to the fund
in the hands of the Sheriff.

The facts of this case very fully appear in'the charge of the Court,
which was delivered, February 20th, 1854, by
WOODWARD, J.-Gentlemen of the jury: This case involves a

question of property. It is an action of replevin, commenced in
this Court by Nathan' T. Carryl, who survived William J. Ward,
late copartners, under the firm of Ward & Co., against Robert
Taylor, to recover a barque or vessel, called the Royal Saxon, her
boats, tackle, apparel and furniture. In Pennsylvania this action
lies in all cases where one man claims goods or chattels in the possession of another, without regard to the manner in which the possession was obtained. It differs in some respects from all other
actions. Generally, a plaintiff is not put in possession of the thing
demanded, until after a decision is had in his favor; but in this
action he may be, and frequently. is put in possession of the chattel
in dispute by the Sheriff, before any trial. The defendant may
retain the chattel, and substitute for it a claim property bond; but if
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such a bond, with satisfactory sureties, be not given, the Sheriff
takes the chattel out of his possession, and delivers it to the plaintiff. This was the course here. Taylor offered no bond, and the
Royal Saxon was turned over by the Sheriff to the plaintiff. But
the defendant comes in and pleads "property" to the plaintiff's action
-that is, he claims to have been the ownier of the Royal Saxon,
and that she should be restored to him together with damages for
her detention. -The plaintiff denies his claim, and thus they virtuually, change positions, as plaintiffs and defendants, though in form
they stand on the record as when the suit-was commenced. The
vessel having been delivered to the plaintiff on the replevin, the
verdict, if rendered for him, will be for such damages as he sustained by the. defendant's detention of her up to the time of the
execution of the writ of replevin. If rendered for the dedfendant,
the verdict will be for a return of the vessel, and damages for the
plaintiff 's dbtention of her. The usual measure of damages in such
dases, is the interest on the value of the chattel. And though in
circumstances of aggravation, juries are sometimeg permitted to give
damages beyond the interest on the value, yet in this case I instruct
you there are no facts in: proof which would justify a verdict bhyond
the ordinary measure.
From this brief statement of the nature of the action, and of the
relation of the parties to the subject matter in dispute, you -will see
that our .duty is to test the titles of the respective parties to the
Royal Saxon. Both parties claira under judicial sales-the plaintiff by virtue of & Sheriff's sale, made in the course, of proceedings.
in foreign attachment, had in the. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania;the defendant, by virtue of a .Marshals 'sale, made in pursuance
of proceedings in Admiralty in the District Court of the UnitedStates, 'for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Some few questions of fact and various: qupstion of law of considerable importance, grow out of- these sales, and the proceedings
that led to them, and counsel having discussed them with great
energy and- ability, it becomes my duty to decide the questions of
law, and to submit fbr your decision the questions of. fact, andthat
we may proceea orderly and intelligibly through the mass of mat-
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ter, which has been placed before us, I propose to direct your attention : 1st, to the title of the plaintiff, and 2d, to the title of the
defendant.
I. As to the plaintiff's title.
In the month of September, 1847, Robert McIntire, of the City
of Londonderry, Ireland, was the owner of the vessel. Some time
in that month she sailed frbm that port -withJames C. Ingleby as her
master, a crew of ten seamen, and laden with passengers, for the
port of Philadelphia, where she arrived safely on or about the
27th of October, 1847.
On the 4th day of November, 1847, McGee & Co., as creditors
of Robert McIntire and William F. McIntire, issued out of the Supreme Court, their writ of foreign attachment against th6 McIntires,
and on the 8th of November, 1847, the Sheriff returned that he had
attached the barque Royal Saxon, and summoned Capt. Ingleby as
garnishee.
On the 15th January, 1848, on the petition of James McGee, one
of the attaching creditors, the Court granted a rule on the garnishee,
to show cause why the vessel should not be sold, as chargeable and
perishable property.
18th January, 1848, Robert Bell issued out of this Court his
foreign attachment against Robert Mcntire, attached the same vessel,
and summoned Capt. Ingleby and Robert Taylor, this defendant, as
garnishees, and on the 20th January, applied for and obtained a
similar order of sale.
24th January, 1848, the garnishees appearing by Mr. Hood, their
counsel, obtained a rule on the plaintiffs in these attachments, to show
cause why the.Royal Saxon should not be discharged from the custody of the Sheriff. The grounds of this motion will be stated
hereafter. It is adverted to now not oily to maintain the chronology of the proceedings, but because it may have some bearing on
the question of possession, which you will have to pass on, and
which, in due time, shall be fully developed.
29th January, this rule was discharged, and the rules for an
order of sale in both the foreign attachments were made absolute.
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31st January, an order of sale issued to the Sheriff in each
case.
9th of February, Mr. Hood moves to rescind the order of sale,
and same day, the motion denied.
21st February, the Sheriff returns the ship sold to Wm. J.
Ward and Nathan T. Carryl, for 62,800.
Such is the derivation of the plaintiff's title.
The Supreme Court had jurisdiction in the premises, and the writs
of foreign attachment were well issued and served. On the face of
this record the plaintiff's title is regular and valid, and unless the
defendant has made out a paramount right, the plaintiff's title must
prevail.
Let us now trace the title of the defendant.
On the 21st day of January, 1848, the seamen on board. the
Royal Saxon, filed their libel in the District Court, sitting in Admiralty, for the balances of wages due them respectively, up to that
date, and praying for the process of the Court, according to the
course of Courts of Admiralty. Process, in the nature of an attachment, was thereupon awarded, to which th( Marshal, on the
same day, made return in these words: "Attached the bcrque
Royal Saxon, and found a Sheriff's officer on board, claiming to
have her in custody."
24th of January, 1848, the answer of James C. Ingleby, mastei
of said barque, was put in, admitting the wages claimed by the
libellants.
25th January, Captain Ingleby presented his petition to the
District Court, setting forth that the foreign attachments of McGee
& Co., and of Robert Bell, had been laid upon the vessel; that she
had been libelled by the seamen and by Robert Taylor, her consignee; that he had himself made large advances on the.credit of
the barque and her owner; that her daily expenses were about $14,
and that she was deprived of all opportunity to earn freight, being
detained in custody. The petition was referred to a Commissioner,
who reported on the 28th January, the facts set out in the petition,
and that she was suffering, and wouild continue to suffer deterioration
and damage, and recommending that she be sold.
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On the 4th February, the Court made an interlocutory order for
the sale of the vessel as chargeable and perishable property; I and
in pursuance thereof, the Marshal, on the 15th of February, sold
her at- public sale to Robert Taylor, for $1600, which he paid into
Court, and on the 22d February made and acknowledged'his deed,
in due form to Mr. Taylor; and next day put him into possession of
'the vessel, from whom she was retaken by the present writ of
replevin. Such is the title.of the defendant.
It was upon the ground of these proceedings in Admiralty, that
Mr. Hood moved the Supreme Court on the 24th January, to
discharge the vessel froi the custody of the Sheriff. The rule
obtained was discharged, as we have seen, on the 29th Jauary.
It is now insisted on behalf of the defendant, that the Sheriff
never obtained- possession of the vessel under the foreign attachment,
and that she was in the exclusive possession of the Marshal from
the time his attachment was laid.
The process of foreign attachment has for its objects:
1. To compel the appearance of a non-resident debtor to the
action of his creditors.
-2. To obtain satisfaction out of the property attached for the
debt claimed.

It is called'fore4gnattachment because it issues against a party
foreign to our jurisdiction, and for the further purpose of distinguishing it from domestic attachment, the qualities and consequences
of which process difer in many essential points from foreign
attachment.. It may go against specific property of' the defendant,
whether in the hands of any person or not, or it may be. directed
against goods and chattels, rights and credits generally of the-nonresident debtor.' In this last case, the writ is. executed by the
service of a copy on the person named- as garnishee, with notice
annexed by the officer, that by virtue of the writ he attaches all
and singular the goods and chattels of the defendant in his hands
or possession, and summons him as garnishee, Our Act of Assembly
of 13th June, 1836, contains provisions in regard to-attaching real
estate which it is not necessary to bring to your notice..

I Wall'vs. The Royal Saxon,

ante, p. 324.
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But when the writ is directed against a specific chatel, it is the
duty of the Sheriff to take it into custody. If he finds anybody in
possession, he summons him as garnishee-a name which indicates
that he is warned that the property is in the custody of the law.
The 50th section of the Act of Assembly just referred to, proides
that "the goods and effects of the defendant in the attachment, in
the hands of the garnishee, shall, after such service, be bound by
such writ, and be in the officer's power, and if susceptible of
8eizure, or manual occupation, the officer shal ]proceed to secure the
same," to.

The Sheriff was bound in this case to take the ship in custody.
His return iinpoxts that he did-the motion of Mr. Hood on behalf
of the garnishees on the 24th January, assumed that it was in the
custody of the Sheriff-the return of the Marshal to the attachment
out of the.District Court asserts it-the petition of Capt. Ingleby
re-asserts if-and Johnson, in his deposition, swears that the Sheriff
put him in ch'arge of the vessel, and that he remained there until
the Sheriff's sale. That the Marshal's lock may have remained on
the vessel after the termination of the proceedings for the forfeiture,
the record of which is in evidence, is quite probable. Mr. Waln,
who was counsel for the creditors, explains that while that proceeding
was pending on behalf of the Government, he was willing to withdraw
the Sheriff's officer to save expenses, but that, he kept his eye on
the proceeding; 'and before it was terminated ordered the man
Johnson back into possession. If this question of possession had
arisen .on the proceedings for the forfeiture of the vessel, there
might ibe some ground for alleging that, as against the Government,
the Sheriff had lost the possession. But.the libel on behalf of the,
Government was dismissed on the 6th of December, so that no
questio'n is in dispute between the Government and the. plaintiff;
and as.aguinst the libellants of the 21st January, the evidence of
possession in the Sheriff is overwhelming. This question of possession, if question it can be called, is for the jury, but it is so fully
proved by -admissions from all sides, and by documentary as well as
oral evidence, that no jury,. and certainly not so intelligent a jury
as I am now addressing, can be expected to hesitate or doubt
about it.
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If, then, the Sheriff, under process that required him to take
possession of the thing in controversy, did take it and keep it, how
did the Admiralty acquire jurisdiction over it? The proceedings
in Admiralty are said to be purely in rem. Let this be granted.
But before effective' proceedings in ren can be had, in any court,
the thing must be brought within the control of the court-there
must be custody. But the Sheriff anl the Marshal could not both
have the custody of the vessel, any more than two magnitudes can
occupy the" same space at the same instant.

The presence of the

Marshal on the ship does not prove his custody, for the Sheriff's
officer was there before him, and in such a conflict the law adjudges
him in possession who has the best right. The Marshal did not
dispossess nor, attempt to dispossess the Sheriff's officer, but
prudently retired himself, and informed the Court in his return that
the vessel was in the custody of the Sheriff. After that, the Court
of Admiralty could not proceed a step in respect to that vessel
whilst she remained in the custody of an independent and competent
jurisdiction. In Rogan vs. Lucas, 10 Peters, where the same
chattels were claimed in execution both by the Marshal and the
Sheriff-by the Marshal under common law process from the
District Court of the United States, and by the Sheriff uluder similar
process from a State Court-it was said by Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "had
the property remained in the possession of the Sheriff, under the
first levy, it is clear the Marshal could not have taken it in execution,
for the property could not be subject to two jurisdictions at the
same time. The first levy, whether it were made under the Federal
or State authority, withdraws the property from the reach of the
process of -the other. The Marshal or the Sheriff, as the case may
be, by a levy acquires a special property in the goods, and may
maintain an action for them. But if the same goods may 'be taken
in execution at the same time by the Marshal and the Sheriff, does
this special property vest in the one or the other, or both of them?
No such case *can exist--wroperty once levied on remains in the
custody of the law, and it is not liable to be taken by another execution in the hands of a different officer, and especially by an officer
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acting under a different jurisdiction."

These are obvious and

salutary principles, and well calculated to avoid unseemly conflicts
between Federal and State authorities; but they do not apply here,
say the defendant's counsel, for reasons which I proceed now to
notice. I am called on to charge that by the maritime law, mariners'
wages have a priority over all other claims, and constitute a privileged lien upon the vessel in which they have been earned, and
when this lien is sought to be enforced in the Admiralty by libel,
and the Marshal has attached the vessel, it is in the exclusive custody
of ihe Admiralty, and such exclusive custody exists, notwithstanding
a previous foreign attachment from a court of law, served on the
vessel by the Sheriff. The 8th and 9th points re-assert this doctrine
in regard to the possession, and declare that the Marshal had the
exclusive legal custody of the vessel, from the time he served his
attachment till he sold her, and that the Sheriff's possession was.
ended, superseded, or at least suspended.
If these positions are well taken and can be sustained, they throw
the Sheriff and the plaintiff's case overboard. Let us consider them.
Of the priority and the sacredness of the mariner's libn for wages
there is no doubt. All the writers on maritime law assert it, and
judges have tortured themselves to find language elevated and
strong enough to describe it. What is said of it in ConkEng's. Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice-that it is a sacred lien, and as
long as a;plank of the vessel or a fragment of the freight remains,
the mariner is entitled to it in preference to all other persons; as a
security for remuneration-is abundantly sustained by authority.
But is it the law thab a lien so universally acknowledged-so meritorious, and so paramount, must be asserted in a court of Admiralty,.
and cannot be recognized in a court of common law? Nay, more
-that a court of common law is so incompetent to provide for such
a lien, that when in the very ae" of converting, the vessel into
money, for the benefit of all in interest, its process must be arrested
midway, its officers displaced, and the vessel be surrendered to the
admiralty?
The defendant's propositions involve an affirmative to these questions. The case of the Flora, in 1 Haggard's R. 298, does not
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sustain these propositions. The ship there had been levied in execution by the Sheriff, who had her in custody when she was arrested
on the Admiralty process, but there seemed, says the Reporter, to
have been an understanding that the vessel should remain in the
actual custody and personal possession of the Sheriff's officer; and
from a foot-note we learn that the counsel of the execution creditor,
fearing a commission in bankruptcy, which might cut out his execution, preferred a sale by the Marshal instead of the Sheriff. Under this permissive sale he claimed and recovered his client's money
on the execution. There was no assertion of the Sheriff's right to
sell under the execution. It was yielded, for a reason.that is specified, and how this case can. be thought to sustain the principles
contended for here, I confess myself unable to see.
The case of-the Spartan, in Ware's R. 147, comes nearer to thQ
point before us. The learned Judge of the DTistrict Court of
Maine, ruled that the lien of the mariners attached to the freight
and cargo of the vessel, and that they were not prevented from
proceeding in admiralty by previous attachments pending in the
State Court. But it'is material to observe that we are not informed
of the nature of these attachments, nor of the mode of executing
them. If they required the Slieriff to take the cargo into actual
custody, and he had done so, the case would resemble the present.
And then we should have expected some reason of a more general and conclusive character, than that which was rendered for
the ruling. The reason assigned was, that the mariner's lien was
a privileged lien, but, if in Pennsylvania, such a lien can be Tecognized and satisfied in our State Courts, we cannot be expected to
feel the force that is claimed for the reasoning of Judge Ware.
If to these cases be added the opinion of the learned Judge of
the Distri~t Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, we
have the sum of the authorities relied on for the propositions of the
defendant's counsel, for I lay out of view the dicta of Mr. Justice
Story in the case in Sumner; dicta of a most learned Judge, but
whose well known anxiety to enlarge the admiralty'jurisdiction,
betrayed him into opinions which his.brethren on the bench of the
Supreme Court of the United States have not been willing to
adopt and follow.
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When claims, so much in derogation of the common laiv, and so
subversive of the dignity of State tribunals, are set up in behalf of
the admiralty, they ought to be well supported, both by r ason and
authority. We have seen how they stand on authority. Let us
next see what reasons are urged in their support.
It is urged as a distinction of great importance, that the admiralty process is a proceeding in rem, whilst that by foreign attachment is not. Foreign attachment has frequently been said to be in
the nature of a proceeding in rem. I refer to Phelps vs. Holker,
1 Dal. 264; Fitch vs. Boss,4 S. & R. 563; Kilborn vs. Woodworth, 5 Johnson, 37; Jackson vs. Bank United States, 10 Barr,
67; Christmasvs. Biddle, 1 H. 223; Cocheneur's -Executorsvs.
Hostetter, 6 H. 418.
And when it goes against a specific chattel, of which thb law requires, as I have shown, that the Sheriff should take manual custody, it is strictly a proceeding in rem. True, it may be dissolved,
and turned into mere personal process by the defendants appearing
and entering bail, but until this is done, and it was never done in
the case before us, it does not lose its specific chiracter. And the
interlocutory order for the sale of the chattel attached as perishable, what is that but a proceeding inrem.P In Admiralty it is
claimed and admitted to be in rem. But if such an order-is iirem
in one Court, why is it not in the other ? Some broader reason
must be found for the alleged distinction, than the entitling of the
process-a reasofi founded in the nature of legal principles is
wanted-and none such have I seen or heard. Such a sale is not
peculiar to the admiralty jurisdiction, but occurs in every Court
where perishable property is taken in custodia legis. It is a duty"
to sell it, to save it. ""It is to the interest of nobody that it shquld
go to waste, or be permitted to consume itself in the cost of keeping. Sold for the benefit of all concerned, the price it brings is
substituted for the thing itself, and whatever rights existed in the
thing, are !.ecognized in respect to its equivalent. These are general principles, and I cannot doubt they were as applicable to the
sale of the Royal Saxon made by the Sheriff, as to that made by
the Marshal.
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It may be added that foreign attachment when proceeded in as
this was, is much more an action in rem than replevin, which has
not generally been considered an action in rem. Yet Judge Grier,
in the petitory suit of Taylor to recover* possession of this ship
against the plaintiff's replevin, reported in 1 Wallace, jr. 322, proceeds on the ground that replevin .i an action in rem, and that the"
ship having been delivered to plaintiff by due process of law, the
Admiralty had no jurisdiction to restore her to Taylor. He held
that the title of the parties must be tried in the State Court. But,
let it now be observed, if replevin out of a State Court can deliver a
chattel beyond the reach of the Admiralty, much rather can foreign
attachment, especially when attended with a sale of the chattel as
perishable. Thus the authority of the District Court on the question before us, -highly respected as it is, is more than answered-is
reversed, by the Circuit Court. The obi'ter dictum of the latter as
to Taylor's title, is entitled to just that measure of respect which is
due to what a distinguished Judge says about a matter over which
he solemnly decides he has no jurisdiction.
I-feel authorized, in view of all that has been said, to decide that
the foreign attachments laid and the orders of sale made by the
Supreme Court, were proceedings in rem, as truly, and" in exactly
the same sense, as the similar proceedings in Admiralty are so denominated-and hence it follows, that, not the owner's interest in
the vessel merely, but the vessel itself was sold by the Sheriff to the
plaintiff in this action. And it follows also that the Sheriff's possession up to the time of sale, if actually continued, was in law the
exclusive possession, and that so far from the Marshal having the
exclusive possession, as I am called on to charge, he acquired no
possession whatever, either in fact or law, until after the Sheriff's
sale. A consequence of this last, conclusion is, that the Admiralty
proceeded without having acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter,
for the .property could not be the subject of two jursdictiotis at the
same time.
And this leads me to.say, that I etnnot reconcile my mind to the
idea that under the Constitution and laws of the General Government, the Admiralty can extinguish the jurisdiction of the State
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Courts, by laying its hand on the subject matter to which that jurisdiction has regularly attached. The States, and the people of the
States, vested in the Federal Judiciary jurisdiction "in all cases of
Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," and by the Judiciary Act,
Congress provided the District Courts for the exercise, in the first
instance, of this jurisdiction. Itis a civil law-jurisdiction, the same,
says Chancellor Kent, as the marine law of Europe, but it was never
designed to come in conflict with the common law jurisdiction, which
all of-the original States recognized and retained. In England, from
whence niost of our legal principles have been derived, the Admiralty
had long been under curb by statute as well as judicial decision,
at the adoption .of our Federal Constitution, and I suppose ,it was
that -restrainedjurisdictionwhich our fathers intended to grant in
and by the Federal Compact. If any man, la;yer or layman, has
been misled by the extravagant doctrines advanced by the late Justice Story, in the case of .De Lovio vs. Boit, 2 Gallison's R., 398;
the opinions of Mr. Justice Johnson in Ramsay vs. .Allegre, 12
Wheaton, 614, and of Justice Baldwin in the case of Bains vs. The
S9chooner James and Catharine,1 Baldwin's R. 544, will be found
excellent correctives.
Of one thing there is no doubt-that the trial by jury, the glory
of the Common Law, but ,unknown to the Civil, was prized by our
sturdy ancestors above all price, and whoever undertakes to demonstrate that they iiitroduced into our political system an element that
was subversive of this great bulwark of liberty--an overshadowing
power to blight the Common Law jurisdiction of the country, with
all its equitable principles and adaptive capacities, will find a work
on hand that will demand all his diligence. Until this work be.
satisfactorily performed, I shall continue in the faith that the right
of our Courts to attach a-vessel within our jurisdiction, by process
of foreign attachment, and proceed in due course to'sell her to the
highest and best bidder, cannot be interrupted, after the custody of
the vessel is obtained, by the exercise of any judicial power vested
in thie Federal Government. If proceedings in Admiralty, at the
instance of the government, .for violation of the Navigation or*Passenger Laws of"the country, be an excepted case, it is an exception
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which pertains to sovereignty and does not qualify the rule as it
applies inter partes.

There is no principle better settled in our jurisprudence, not even
the privileged lien of seamen for their wages, than that where there
is concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal which first obtains possession
of the. subject matter, shall be left to determine it onclusively.
This principle is essential to the integrity of our system of government, and to the harmonious movements of its various parts. The
judiciary of Pennsylvania has uniformly observed this principle with
scrupulous deicacy, and we have a right to insist that it be respected
be enforced
by the federal authorities. But, respected or not, it *ill
on all proper occasions.
It is insisted, however, that this was not a case oi concurrent
jurisdiction. .Unless the extravagant claims of the Admiralty to
override the State Judiciary be admitted, the concurrence isbeyond
question. The creditors of McIntire had a right to attach the ship.
The Supreme Court had jurisdiction.- We proceeded in rem, and
sold her. This divested all liens,. for such is the dfFect of judicial
sales in Pennsylvania. The mariners .were then turned over to the
fund. -Of that the Court had possession, and were competent to
recognize the maritime principle which-gave them a preference, and
distribution pro tanto. could have been made as soon as an audit
had ascertained the amounts due them. Mariners are not compelled
to seek their remedy in admiralty, by proceeding against the ship.
They have a three-fold remedy-against the ship-against the
master-and against the owner-to which must be added, according
to Judge Ware in the case of the Spartan-against the freight and
cargo also. They may proceed in admiralty in rem, or in personam,
or in common law courts in common law forms. It is creditable to
the humanity of the civilized world that their remedies .are so various
and ample; but it would be a disgrace put upon us as a State tribunal, if we could not administer any one, of so multiform remedies.
Suppose the estate of the owner, or the proceeds of the cargo to
come into our' Court by process of law-what is to hinder our
paying the liens of the mariners as well as of other creditors.
The Sheriff's sale, in this instance, was for all whom it might con-

-
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cern-for the mariner, the material man-the bottomry creditorthe owner-the attaching creditor, and for whomsoever had rights
in the ship.
Then it was a proceeding strictly concurrent with that in the
Admiralty, and having first attached, all recognized principles, not
only of comity and good manners, but of law, entitled this Court to
proceed and finish what it had fairly begun. The schedule filed
with the libel of the mariners, shows that the greater part of the
wages- claimed by them, accrued while the vessel was lying in this
port, and after the foreign attachments were laid. These surely
could have beeni paid out of the fund in Court as custody charges,
just as Johnson, the Sheriff's officer, was paid for his services. But
as to all their wages, I hold the Court was competent to ascertain
and pay them without awaiting the final judgment in the-foreign
attachments. And from this it follows, that there is nothing in the
argument drawn from the necessity for prompt and speedy redress
to the mariner, for in this cse, they could have got -their nioney
sooner in the Supreme Court than they did get it in the Admiralty.
Ordinarily, however, I admit the Admiralty is better calculated to
redress the seaman speedily than common law tribunals, but" the
interests of foreign commerce, unquestionably important as they
are, must not be s6 magnified as .to obscure other equial interests.
American creditors- have rights as well as foreign seamen, and the
State Courts have powers to preserve, which are anterior to any
Federal tribunal, and which, having never been delegated by the
people, are not to be torn from us byjudicial construction. The
preservation of State authority, in its just rights, is a duty of paramount obligation. The welfare of the wolepieop e depends on this,
and no plea of inconvenience wbich may come from commerce or
any other quarter, should- induce us to neglect it.
I have said judicial sales in Pennsylvania divest all liens. This is
true of real estate, except in the case of such mortgages as are protected by statute, and such liens as do not admit of ascertainment in
moneys numfbered. But it is universally true of chattels. Where the
proceeding is not in rem, the sale only divests the title of the
defendant, but
transfers that unencumbered to the purchaser.
-

-it
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Where the proceeding is in rem, it transfers the thing equally discharged from all liens. Such is the settled policy of our law, and
it is a circumstance worthy of notice, that in the great case of the
Corporiationvs. Wal.ace, B Rawle where these principles were discussed very thoroughly, the Court put this very case by way of illustration: " A ship," says Judge Huston, "may be mortgaged at
sea, aad all muniments Qf title, fairly given *tothe mortgagee: on
her return, she may, for other debts, be libelled in the Admiralty,
or before the mortgagee can take possession, may.be levied in execution. When 'sold, according to law, the prior lien takes' the
money, whether that lien is seamen's wages, a bottomry bond or
mortgage, and this whether sold by order of the Admiralty or on
execution. I know of no case where once sold by process of a
Court having jtirisdiction, she has again been sold by process of the.
same Court, or of any other Court in the same coimtry, for any
debt of her former owner." This was said arguendo, and by way
of illustration, it is true, but it was said by a Judge of great experience and acute observation, and is entitlea to respect as evidence
of the law.
On the whole, I am of opinion that there'is not adequate ground
either in the authorities or the reasons of the law for the distinctions
and claims which are set up here in behalf of the Admiralty jurisdiction and process, and it results, of course that, if you find the
Sheriff maintained his first possession of the vessel until he sold
her, the plaintiff acquired a perfect title by the Sheriffs sale, and
the defendant acquired none by the Marshal's. If the Sheriff had
not the possession under his process, she was open to the process of
the Admiralty, and the defendant's title would be best, but on this
question of possession, the evidefce is so nearly conclusive, that my
mind cannot raise a doubt, ana I have no expectation you will entertain any.
There are no equities in the case; each party stands on his legal
title. There are circumstances in proof from which it is fair to
presume, that each had. notice of the proceedings under which the
other claims, and so had the creditors under whom the respective parties claim. The attachment creditors did intervene in the Admniralty
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case, and the mariners might have intervened in the foreign attachments. But the titles of the parties before us are unaffected by
these circumstances, and depend on the principles discussed, and
the question of possession submitted to you. If the plaintif receives your verdict it should be for him generally, or at most, .with
only nominal damages. The defendant's possession of the vessel
was under color of title, and for so short a time, that I do not consider this a case for damages against him.
I have now, gentlemen explained, if I havenot justified, the views
I entertain on the interesting questions which have been agitated in
this cause. If any point on either side has not been substantially
answered, in what has been said, it may be considered as ruled
against the party propounding it.
The jury subsequently found for the Plaintiff, and assessed his
damages at'six cents.

In the District Court of the United States, for the. Wisconsin
Distriet.
THE UNITED STATES EX. REL. B. S. GARLAND V8. TIMOTHY D. MORRIS.
1. The master'of a fugitive slave, having him apprehended by the Marshal, in pursuance of a warrant, cannot be arrested for assault and battery committed on
such fugitve, 'while making the arrest, in aid and at the request of the Marshal,
before the final hearing and order of the Judge.
2. A warrant for the apprehension of a fugitive slave is in full force until the final
hearing and order; and after a reicue, a fresh pursuit may be made by the Marshal and owner with the same warrant.
8. Thq service of process under the United States cannot be intrrpted'by the
any other
arrest of the officer in person aiding him in serving such process; or i.q
manner, 'by means of State process or warrants.

J.-The relator, a citizen of the State of Missouri, obtained a wa'rant upon affidavit, for the -apprehension of Joshua
Glover, wh6m he alleged to be his slave for life, and as such to.owe
him service and*labor in the State of Missouri, whence he escaped.
The warrant was issued to the Marshal, who arrested the fugitive,
MILLER,
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with the aid of the relator,.in the county of Racine, in this State,
and placed him in the jail of Milwaukie County for safe keeping,
until the hearing. The same day of the arrest and imprisonment,
a warrant was issued by the Mayor of the city of Racine upon the
affidavit of one Janes Clement, against the ielator, for assault and
battery upon the body of Glover. In the afteihoon of the day of
the imprisonment of Glover, a mob rescued him by forcing the jail
doors; and at the same time the warrant for the arrest of the relator
was placed in the hands of the respondent Morris, as Sheriff of Racine
county for service; and just after the rescue, it'was executed by the
arrest of Garland, the relator. Before the rescue, a writ of habeas
corpus was issued by the .Judge of Milwaukie County.to the Marshal, and also the Sheriff of Milwaukie County, to produce the
body of the fugitive Glover; which writ was not obeyed.
The relator applied to me as the Judge of the District Court of
the United States for this District, for a writ of habeas corpus;
which wis allowed, and directed to the respondent to produce the
body of his prisoner. The respondent made answer to this writ,
that he held the custody of the relator, by virtue of the warrant of
the Mayor of Racine, as above stated.
This writ of habeas 5c rpus was allowed under the act of Congress,
of March 2,1833-4, Statutes at Large, 632, which is, "That either
of the justices of .the Supreme Court, or a judge of any District
Court of the United States, in addition to the authority already
conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus
in cases of a prisoner or prisoners in jail or confinement, when he
or -they shall be committed or confined, in or by any authority or
law, for any act done or committed to be done, in pursuance of a
law of the United States, or any order, process, or decree, of any.
judge or court thereof, any thing in any act of Congress to the contrary notwithstanding."
The Deputy Marshal, who served the warrant for the apprehension of Glover, the fugitive, made return to that warrant, with an
affidavit as to the truth of the facts set forth in said return. In
that return, he states that "In pursuance of the next warrant, he
proceeded, with the said B. S. Garland and other deputies, to
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Racine County, where the said Glover was with difficulty, and after
resistance, arrested, with the aid of said Garland and others, as required by me. In making said arrest, no more force was used than
was actually necessary, for the resistance by said Glover and others
was great. This return was read at the hearing, when the couinsel
of the relator"called this deputy marshal to testify to the facts connected with making the arrest, including the above. "The counsel
opposed objected thereto, and also declined calling any witnesses.
on their part, or giving any evidence but the respundent's warrant.
I do not deem it necessary to hear the deputy marshal state the
facts already sworn to by him, and on file in this Court, particularly under the .objection. For the purpqses of this hearing, I consider the facts above stated sufficiently attested.
Glover, the fugitive, did not make the complaint against this
relator, before the Mayor of Racine; nor does it appear that he
authorized Clement to do so in his behalf, or that Clement had personal knowledge of the matter of the complaint. It is not shown
that there was any other cause of complaint'by Glover against the
relator; nor is it at all probable that there could be, as. the relator
resides in Missouri, and came from there here. I view this warrant
of the Mayor to have been obtained by an officious intermeddler, for
the same purpose as the habeas corpus-to effect the rescue of the
fugitive Glover. The affidavit of Garland, the warrant for' the
apprehension of Glover, the return under oath, the resue, and the
habeas corpus from the County Court, are sufficient to satisfy-me,
for the purposes of this hearing, that Gorland the relator, is the
master of Glover, and that no more force was used than w*s nqcessary to effect the apprehension of his fugitive slave. By the Act
to amend and Supplementary to, the Aqt respecting Fugitives, &c.,
ch. 7, 4 Statutes at Large, 462: "When a person held to s.ervice or
labor in any state or territory of the United States, has heretofore,
or shall hereafter escape into another state or territory of the
United States, the person or persois to whom such labor or service
may be due, or his, her or their agent or -attorney, duly authorized
by power of attorney in writing, acknowledged and certified under
the seal of some legal officer or court of the state or territory in
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which the same may be executed, may pursue and reclaim such
fugitive person, either by procuring a warrant from some one of the
courts, judges, or commissioners aforesaid, of the proper circuit,
district or county, for the apprehension of such fugitive from service
or labor; or by seizing and arrestipg such fugitive where the same
can be done without process, and by taking or causing such person
to be taken, forthwith before such cdurt, judge or commissioner,
whose duty it shall be 'to hear and determine, the case of such
claimant in a summary manner." This law gave the relator Garland,
the choice to apprehend his fugitive slave either with or without a
warrant, and to take him before a judge or a commissioner for hearing. In this case he was aiding the Marshal in the service of a
warrant, at the officer's request. He was acting under a law of
the United States, and also aiding the Marshal, or officer, in tie
service of process of the United States. The relator is clearly a
person within the act of the 2d March, 1833, upon which this writ
was allowed.
It is too well settled, for me to quote authorities, that the judiciary
of the Federal and of the State governments, are entirely independent
of each other; and that the Courts of one government cannot by warrant injunction, or any other writ, or process, restrain br interrupt
the service of the process of the other. The warrant for the apprehension of Glover,. the fugitive, had not been fully executed by the
arrest merely, and when Garland, the relator, was arrested by this
respondent, it was in full force until the fugitive was brought before the Judge, or Commissioner, and an order made, either to dtscharge him from custody or to remand him to his master. Glover
has been rescued and is now at large, and is liable to be re-arrested
upon that same warrant.
The relator and the Marshal have a legal right to enter- upon
fresh pursuit of the fugitive. By the law, the Marshal is liable for
the full value of this fugitive, in Missouri, to the master, and for
this cause he is inclined, no doubt, to retake him; and he has also
a right, still to require the aid of this relator. For these reasons,
I cannot but consider the imprisonment of the relator, or of the
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Marshal, (who was also prosecuted in Racine,) a greater outrage
than the rescue.
The law under which the fugitive was apprehended, is a law of
the United States, adopted in pursuance of the Constitution, and
must be enforced. The Judges, Commissioners, Marshals, or claimants are not to be interfered with, in its administration or execution,
by State Courts or officers. The process, or warTant, shall be
served without hindrance from any quarter; the same as process
issued in pursuance of any other law. If our Judges and Marshals
should be permitted to be interrupted, or embarrassed in the performance of their duty under that law, they may be under any
other law, or all the laws of the General Government, until they
become dead upon the statute book. The sovereignty of the government, asserte& through the process from its Courts, shall not be
affected or.nullified by resistance, or by the arrest of officers or men
engaged in the service of such process. If this proceeding were
tolerated, rescues may be made in any case, where the Marshal has
the custody of a prisoner, by arresting the Marshal, and withdrawing him from such duty. While the Marshal is serving his process,
the person or property seized or arrested, and in his custodcy,'1y
virtue of such process, calffot be taken out of his custody either
directly or indirectly, by means of process of any kind or description from the State Courts ; nor will Ipermit the Marshal to interrupt, or interfere'with the service of process from the State Courts.
I have directed the Marshal to returfi to Sheriffs property he had
thken from them by replevin, which they had seized upon execution
or attachment. The Cgurts of the. two governments are located in
the same State, but are independent of each other; and are not to
be brought in conflict without endangering the harmony of these
governments. The rules adopted by the Supreme Court of 'the
United States, on this subject, are well defined, and must b'e adhered
to. If this case were in the State Court, I have no doubt of the
discharge of this relator from the custody of the Marshal; as it
would be the duty of that Court to require the full service of its
first process; and I should direct the Marshal to comply with such
order without delay. The act of Congress, of 1883' gives the same
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power to the Federal Courts, in this particular, as is vested in the
State Courts. It is true that, that act does not expressly empower
the Judges to hear and determine the matter upon the return of the
writ of habeas corpus, but that powe is necessarily inferred, from
the power to allow the writ.
The relator is ordered to be discharged.

In the Supreme Court of Maine."
WOOD _ET AL. vs. LITTLE ET AL.
1. It is believed that, both in England and in this country * right to partition is
incident to all real estate, held in joint tenancy or tenancy in common.
2. Upon a division, it is not necessary that the parts be made equal in size orvalue,
inasmuch as the party whose share is less in value may be compensated in money,
under the award of the commissioners.
3. It is not a valid objection to a petition for partition, that the principal part of the.
estate (as for instance a cotton factory) is not divisible into the parts prayed for,.
without destroying it for the purposes for which it had been erected and maintained, provided the division would not destroy it for other purposes.

On facts agreed.
Petition for the partition of real estate.
Upon the estate sought to be divided there is a brick factory
building for the manufacture of cotton, containing about eighteen,
hundred spindles, and fifty looms, with other necessary and appro..
priate machinery for operating the same; the whQle being carried by
one water wheel about six feet in diameter, with a head and fall of
water about fifteen feet. There is also connected with the factory amachine shop, being a separate building of brick, the machinery.
in which is carried by a wheel about ten feet in diameter, which isturned by water taken from the factory dam. There is also an
I We are indebted

to the civility of the State Reporter for the early sheetsof. vol.

.35, Maine Rep., whence this case is taken.
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upper dam with a small building standing thereon; and a store and
large dwelling house, called the boarding house, standing on the
premises. Also a small brick building occupied as a counting-room,
with two other small buildings, and the residue of the laud described
in the petition is unoccupied.
The brick building and factory were erected for the special
purpose of a cotton factory, and are fitted with a great variety of
machinery suitable, and such as is exclusively used, for manufacturing cotton cloth, but which has not been used for that or any other
purpose for the last two or three years. This machinery is in no
way attached to or connected with said building, except that the
same is set upon a common floor, and is fastened to the floor by
screws and other fastenings, and all is propelled by the use of bands
from the main water wheel; and the machinery may all be displaced
*andremoved from the building, simply by casting off the bands and
removing the fastenings. The factory is operated by the use of
,one common water wheel-which wheel is its sole motive power.
'The factory cannot be divided into the several parts prayed for in
.the petition without destroying the property for the purposes for
'which it was erected, and for which it has been maintained by the
-owners. But the factory can be divided as prayed for, without
,destroying the same, for purposes and uses other than those for
-which it was erected and has been maintained by the.owners.
The Court is to enter such judgment as justice requires and the
law permits.
May,
H for the petitioners.
1st. The property described in the petition is partible under the
_provisions of R. S. c. 121, § 1, 2, in the same manner it would have
been at common law; We regard the case of Hanon et al. vs.
Willard et als., 12 Maifie, 142, as directly in point and decisive.
2d. The cotton factory, including the machinery, is a part of the
realty, and would pass by a deed describing it as such, and so may
be divided under our statute. Farraref al. vs. Stackpole, 6 Maine,
154.
3d. If it should be found inconvenient or prejudicial to the interests of all concerned to divide the cotton factory, it may be set off
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to one of the tenants in common, under the provisions of R. S. c.
121, § 25. Dyer vs. Lowell, 30 Maine, 217.
Morrell,for the respondents.
The property is not divisible. To destroy the use for the designed purposes, is to destroy the property. It is property which
can be used only in common. Such is its essential condition. To
strip that condition from it, destroys it. In Hanson vs. Willard, 3
Fairf. 142, the Court says the property there in question might be
divided, although at great inconvenience. The implication is, that
property is not divisible, if a destruction of it would follow the partition. Miller vs. Mi7ler, 13 Pick. 237. The petitioners' argument, that the whole factory may be assigned to one of the co-tenants, upon his making compensation in money, does not relieve the
case. For the petition asks that it be set off in parts. Division by.
time is not authorized by the statute. Neither can division be made
by the profits. Where the thing and the profit is the same, a division of the profits must be regarded as a division of the thing. 3
Fairf. 146. But this estate is not of that character.
The possession of this estate, and the use of it to one party for
a limited period, (a month or a year,) and so on to each of the parties, is not a practicableor substantialpartition.
Thb processes of manufacturing are so various and complicated,
involving such immense outlays and the employment of so many
operatives, and requiring such persistency in the undertaking, that
the business cannot be begun and ended in a limited period, and
again repeated at stated intervals.
RIcE, J.-The only question presented for the consideration of
the Court, is, whether the property described in the petition is of
such a character as to be susceptible of partition according to
established rules of law.
The chief value of the property described in the petition consists
of a cotton factory, with its appropriate machinery. The case finds
that "said factory cann.ot be divided into the several parts prayed
for in said petition, without destroying the property for the purposes
for which said factory was erected, and for which the same hhs been
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maintained by the owners thereof. It is, however, agreed that the
said factory can be divided, as prayed for aforesaid, without destroying the same, for purposes and uses other than that for which
it was erected and has been maintained as aforesaid by said
owners."
Such being the facts, the respondents coniend that this property
cannot be made the subject of partition by law. Parceners at common law were entitled to the writ of partition in all cases, except it
was held that castles, necessary to the defence of the realm, from
public considerations, were not subject to this process. By the provisions of c. 31 and 32, Henry VIII, the same rights to obtain
partition were extended to joint tenants and tenants in conmon, as
had been enjoyed by parceners at common law.
In Brown vs. Turner, 1 Atk. 350, it was held, that a.saw-mill
and mill-yard, and materials for a saw-mill, are not partible. The
Court say, "'such a partition would destroy the whole."
Itis believed, however, that this right of partition is incident to
the real estate held in joint tenancy, or tenancy in common, both in
England and in this country.
It has been said that a decree for partition is a matter of right,
and there is no instance of not succeeding in it, but when no proof
is adduced of the title in the plaintiff. Baring vs. Nbrth, 1 .es. &
Bea. 554.
In Turner vs. Morgan, 8 Yes. 143, the Lord Chancellor said,
the law says there is no inconveniince in the partition of a house, as
in case of dower. The difficulty is no objection in this Court.
That is laid down in Fuller vs. Gerard, and appears more strongly
in Warrenyvs. Baynes, Amb. 589, where there was almost insuper-.
able difficulty.
In Morrill vs. MorrilT, 5 N. H. 134, it was decided, that parti.tion may be had of a mill privilege by assigning to each of the
owners so much water as would run through a gate of certain
'dimensions.
The law gives tenants in common an absolute right to have their
lands divided.. Leadbetter vs. Gash, 8 Iredell, 462.
The law has.received a construction in our own -State, in the case
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of Hansom vs. Wilard, 12 Maine, 142. That was a petition for
partition of a mill and mill privilege, in which the same defence was
made as in the case at bar. The Court, after a careful examination
of the authorities, says"We come to the conclusion, that if the petitioner, as he alleges,
is interested with other tenants in common, in the real estate
described in his petition, he -may claim of right to have partition
made, and his share set off and divided from the rest, however
inconvenient it may be to make such partition, or however much
the other co-tenants or the common property may be injured
thereby." This would seem to be decisive of the case. The law
however does not require that the estate shall be divided into pre.cisely equal shares either in size or value.
In England; and many of the States, perhaps, the most common
mode of proceeding to procure partition is by bill in chancery. In
these proceedings, the common practice is, where the property is
of such a character as to be injured or greatly reduced in value by
division, to decree a sale of the whole estate and divide the proceeds. Such was the rule of the civil law. Domat's Civil Law,
§ 2753.
The chancery powers of our Court does not include cases of this
charabter, but substantially the same equitable result may be
reached, under our law, and by this process. § 25 of c. 121, R. S.
provides; when any messuage, tract of land, or other real estate,
shall be of greater value than either party's share of the estate to
be divided, and cannot at the same time be subdivided among them
without great inconvenience, the same may be assigned to one, of
the parties; and the party to whom the same shall be so assigned,
paying such sum of money to such parties, as by means thereof
shall have less than their share of the real estate, as the commissioners shall award; but in such case the partition shall not be
established by the Court, until the sums so awarded, shall be paid
to the parties entitled thereto, or secured to their satisfaction."
Though it ias held jn Codman vs. -Pinkham, 15 Pick. 364,
under statute provisions similar to our own, that the entire estate
cannot be awarded to any one of the tenants in common, but each
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must receive some portion thereof, yet commissioners are authorized
so to divide the estate as to occasion the smallest practical amount
of injury to the whole, and to equalize the parts, if necessary, by
compensation in money. From the description of the estate, as
given in the case, the Court are of opinion that such a division may
be made without destruction to the property, or seriously impairing its value.
Judgment must therefore be entered for partition.
WELLS, and HOWARD, J. J., concurred.
SHEPLEY,

C. J., and HATHWAY, J., concurred in the result.

.New York Court of Appeals, June Term, 1858.
PETER BREASTED ET AL, ADMINISTRATORS &C. OF HIRAM COMFORT,
DECEASED, RESPONDENTS, V8. THE FARMERS' LOAN -AND TRUST
COMPANY, APPELLANT.
To an action on a policy'of insurance on life, which contained a proviso that if the
assured should , die by his own hand, or in consequence of a duel, or by the hands
of justice, or in the known violation of any law of the State, or of the United
States," the defendahts pleaded that the deceased committed suicide by drowning
himsef, and so died by his own hand. Replication, that at the time the deceased
so committed suicide, &o., he was of unsound mind, and wholly unconscious of the
act. Held good.

This action was commenced in the late Supreme Court of New.
York, of May Term,1841, and was brought upon a policy of insurance upon the life of Hiram Comfort, the plaintiff'a- intestate.
The policy was dated on the 17th April, 1889, and was for the
period of seven years. It was in the usual form of life policies and
contained this clause: "Provided always, and it is hereby declared
to be the true intent and meaning of this policy, and the same is
accepted by the assured upon the express condition, that in case the
said Hiram Comfort shall die upon the seas, (the- party being con-
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sidered as at sea from the time he embarks or goes on shipboard,
until he lands,) or shall, without the consent of this company, previously obtained and endorsed upon this policy, pass beyond the
settled limits of the United States, (excepting into the settled
limits of the British Provinces of the two Canadas, Nova Scotia or
New Brunswick,) or shall, without such previous consent thus endorsed, visit those parts of the United States which lie north of the
southern boundaries of the States of Virginia and Kentucky: or
shall, without such previous consent thus endorsed, enter into any
military or naval service whatever, (the militia not in actual service
excepted,) or in case he shall die by his own hand, or in consequence
of a duel, or by the hands ofjustice, or in the known violation of any

law of this State, or of the United States, or of the said Piovinces, this
policy shall be.void, null and of no effect." The declaration averred,
that the said Comfort, after the making the said policy and beford
the termination of the time therein mentioned, to wit, on the 25th
June, 1839, at Catskill, in the county of Greene, departed this life,
and then and there died, not by his own hand, or in consequence of
a duel, or by the hands ofjustice, or in the violation of any law of
these states, or of the United States, &q'..&c.

The defendants pleaded, 1st, the general issue, 2d, actio non &c.,
because the said Hiram Comfort committed suicide by then and
there drowning himself in the Hudson river, &c., &c., and so they
say that he dieA by his own hand, and concluding with a verification. 3d. Actio non &e., because they say that the said Hiram at,
&c., did then and there cast and throw himself into the Hudson
river, at the place aforesaid, by means of which, he was then and
there suffocated and drowned, of which drowning he then and there
instantly died, and so they say that the said Hiram killed himself
and died by his own hand, which is the same death, &c., concluding
with a verification.
To the second plea the plaintiff replied, that at the time the said
Hiram committed suicide by then and there drowning himself in
the Hudson river, he was of unsound mind, and ansconscious of
the act, concluding witl a verificaiion.
To the third plea was a like repli6ation, that the said Hiram at
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the time he throwed himself in the Hudson river, by reason of which
he instantly died, he was of unsound mind, and wholly unconscious
of the act, concluding with a verification.
The defendants demurred to both replications, and. the plaintiffs
joined in the demurrer.
The Supreme Court in January Term, 1843, gave judgment for
the plaintiffs on the demurrer. (See 4 Hill, 73.)
In July, 1845, the other issue was referred by the Supreme Court
of thd third district to referees to hear and examine the matters in
controversy. The cause was tried before the saidreferees, who on the
27th August,.1846, reported in favor of the plaintiff, the sum of seven
thousand and twenty-six dollars and thirteen cents, allowing interest
on the policy from sixty days after the first notice. The report of
the referees contains the whole testimony in the cause, and they
found specially among other things, " That the assured on the 25th
day of June, 1839, threw himself into the Hudson river, from the
steamboat Erie, while insane, for the purpose of drowning himself,
not being mentally capable at the time, of distinguishing between
right and wrong."
The Supreme Court, in the third district, in January, 1849, refused to set aside the report, and gave judgment for the plaintiff
thereon. The defendants appealed to this Court.
WT. C. N oyes, for the appellant.
S. Sh&wood, for the respondent.
WILLARD, J.-The question raised by the decision of the referees, is substantially the same -as that decided by the Supreme
Court on the demurrers. It will be unnecessary to give to each, a
separate examination.;
It is material to determine in the first place, what is taeant by
the terms death by his own hands, which is to avoid the policy. If
the words are construed according to the letter, an accidental death
occasioned by the instrumentality of the hand of insured, would
fall within the exception. Thus, should the insured by mistake, swallow poison, and.thereby terminate his life, his representatives could
not Tecover on the policy, if the poison was conveyed to his mouth
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by his own hand. The same rule of construction applied to the
words death by the hands of justice, in the same connection, would
take the case out of the exception, if the death was occasioned by
strangulation by a.rope instead of the hands of the minister of
justice. But it is too plain for argument, that the literalmeaning
is not the true meaning of either phrase. Death by the hands of
justice is a well known.phrase denoting an execution, either public
or private, of a person convicted of crime, in any form allowed by
law. The moral guilt of the party executed has nothing to do'
with the definition. Socrates, though he took the poison from his
own hand, died by the hand of justice, in this sense of the term.
It would be an abuse of language to charge him with an. act of intentional self-destruction. The martyrs who perished at the stake, in
like manner, "died by the hands of justice."
In popular language, the term death by his own hand, means the
same as suicide orfelo de se. The two first, indeed, are not technical terms, and may be used in a sense excluding the idea of
criminality. The connection in which they are used in this policy,
indicates that the phrase death by his own hand, meant an act of
criminal self-destruction. Provisoes declaring the policy to be void
in case the assured commit suicide or die by his own hand,are used
indiscriminately as expressing the same idea. In the note to
.Borradalevs. .Hunter, 5 Man. & Gr. 648, are given the forms of
the proviso used by seventeen of the principal London Insurance
Companies. In eight of them, the exception is of a death by suicide, and in nine, of a death by the assured's own hands. In two,
a separate provision is made in case of a death by suicide, notfelo
de se. It is obvious, therefore, that the phrase death by his own
hand and death by suicide, mean the same thing, and that both,
unless qualified by some other expressions, import a criminal act of
self-destruction. The connection in which they stand in this policy,
favors this construction. The first four exceptions in the policy,
are of acts innocent in themselves, three of which become inoperative, if the defendants give their consent, and have it endorsed on
the policy. Then follow the last four exceptions, viz : if he shall
die by his own hand, or in consequence of a duel, or by the'hands
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of justice, or in the known violation of any law, &c., by the

acknowledged rule rule of construction, nosctur a 8ociis, the first
members of the sentence, if there be any doubt in its meaning,
should be controlled by the other members, which are .entirely unequivocal, and should be construed to mean a felonious killing of
himself. Broome's Maxims, 450, 293. It is a rule laid down by
Lord Bacon, that covulatio verborum indicatacceptationemin eodem

sen8u; the coupling of words together shows that they are to be
understood in the same sense. And when the meaning of any particular word is doubtful or obscure, or when the expression, taken
singly, is inoperative, the intention of the parties using it may frequently be aicertained and carried into effect by looking at the
adjoining words, or at expressions occurring in other parts of the
same instrument for quce non valeant singula juncta juvant.

Bacon's Works, vol. 4, p. 26, 2; Broome's Maxims, 293. Besides,
the words in"this case are those of the insurer, and if susceptible of
t*o meanings, should be taken most strongly against him.
It was not contended on the part of the defendant, that the
policy would be avoided by a merd accidental destruction of life by
the party himself. It was urged that it would be, if the act was
done intentionally, although under circumstances which would
exempt the party from all moral culpability. It was iniisted.that
the expression must be taken to mean a death by his own act. It
seems to -me this is a'yielding of the whole question. An insane
man, incapable of discerning between right and wrong, can form
no intention. His acts are not the result of thought or reason, and
are no more the subject of punishment than those which are produced by accident. The acts of a madman, which are the offspring of the disease,. subject him to no criminal responsibility. If
the insured, while engaged in his trade as a house-joiner,.had abcidentally fallen through an opening in the chamber of a house he
was constructing, and lost his life, the argument concedes that the
insurer would have been liable. The reason is, that the.mind did
not concur with the act. How can this differ in principle from a
death in a fit of insanity, when the party had no mind to concur
in or oppose the act?
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It must occur to every prudent man, seeking to make provision
for his family by an insurance on his life, that insanity is one of
the diseases which may terminate his being. It is s*aid the defendant did not insure the continuance of the intestates reason. Nor
did they in terms, insure him against smallpox or scarlet fever;
but had he died of either disease, no doubt the defendant would
have been liable. They insured the continuance of his life. 'What
difference can it make to them, or to him, whether it is terminated
by the ordinary course of the disease of his bed, or whether in a fit
of delirium he ends it himself? In each case, the death is occasioned by a means within the meaning of 'the policy, if the exception
contemplates, as I think it does, the destruction of life by the intestate while a rational agent, responsible for his act.
It is competent, no doubt, for the insurer so to frame his policy,
as to exclude him from liability for a death occasioned in a fit of
insanity. The parties have not done so in the present case.
It was urged, that because a person non compos mentis is liable
civiliter for torts committed while in a state of insanity, therefore
insanity has no effect to qualify this exception in the policy. That
conclusion is not a legitimate deduction from the premises. A
rational man is liable eivziter for an injury occasioned "by an accident, -unless it be an inevitable one, and yet no one pretends that
the insurer is not liable for a death by accident, whether inevitable
or not. Indeed, the liability for deaths by accident was conceded
on the argument. A death by accident, and a death by the party's
own hand when deprived of reason, stand, on principle, in the same
category. In both cases, the act is done without a controlling mind.
If the insurer is liable in one case, he should be in the other.
If the insured was compelled by duress to take his own life, it
will hardly be contended that the insurer could avoid payment. In
what consists the difference between the duress of man, and the
duress of Heaven ? Can a man be said to do an act prejudicial to
the insured, when he is compelled to do it by irresistible coercion;
and can it make any difference, .whether this coercion comes from
the hand of man or the visitatiQn of Providence ?
But, it is urged that this is a civil action, and the contract of
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insurance a civil contract. Be it so. A person so destitute of reason as not to know the consequence of his acts, can make no valid
contract. Whether the incompetency be the result of disease or of
intoxication, his contracts made while in that condition, are void.
Barret vs. Baxter, 2 Aiken Vt. R. 167, approved by Oh. Walworth, in Prenticevs. Aehorn, 2 Paige, 31, and by Oh. Kent, in 2
Commentaries, 451; Smith's Law of Contracts, 824-833 and notes.
If the party could do no act to bind himself, he certainly could'do
none -to discharge the insurer. If he could not make a bond, he
could not make a release. If he could not make a will; he could
not revoke one.
The liability of a lunatic for necessaries, rests upon the ground
that the law will raise a contract by implication on the part of the
lunatic, in favor of the party who has supplied them in good faith,
and therefore does not affect the present question.
fentworth'vs,
Tubbs, 1 Young & Col. X. C. 171. The cases on this head, are
analogous to that of an infant. See Smith's Law of Contracts, 325,
et seq. and notes, where the cases are collected and reviewed. The
law to prevent a,failure of justice, will imply a promise by.a party
incapable of making a contract; butit will never imply that a party
incapable of distinguishiig between right and wrong was guilty of
fraud.
At the time this case was decided by the Supreme Counrt on the
demurreri there ]had been no case, either in this country or in England, in which the same question had- arisen. The case of Borradale
vs. Hunter, 5 Man. & Gr. 639,. decided by the English Common
Plea$ in 1843, has since been reported. That action was brought
by the executor of the insured, upon a life policy containing a proviso, that in case the. assured should die by his own hands; or by
the hands of justice, or in consequence of a duel, the policy should
be void.. The assured threw himself into the Thames, and was
drowned. Upon an issue, whether the assured died by his own
hands, the jury found, that he voluntarity threw himself into the
water, knowing at the time that he should thereby destroy his life,
and intending thereby to do so; but at the time of committing the
act-he was not capable of judging between right anid wrong. It was
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held by a majority of the Court, Tindal, Ch. J., dissenting, that
the policy was avoided, as the proviso included all acts of voluntary
self-destruction, and was not limited by the accompanying provisoes
to acts of felonious suicide. The judges who formed the majority,
laid the main stress 'upon the fact, that the jury found the act of
self-destruction to be voluntary, that he knew when he threw himtelf into the river he should thereby destroy his life, and that h&intended thereby to do so. The referees in the present case, have
not found that the intestate acted voluntarily, or that he knew the
consequence of his act. They merely find, that while insane, for
the purpose of drowning himself, he threw himself into the river,
not being mentally capable of distinguishing between right and
wrong. If Borradale vs. Hunter be an authority which we.ought
to follow, it differs so much from the case before us, that we are at
liberty to decide it upon principle.
After the case of Borradalevs. Hunter,.the case of Schwabt vs.
C5lift was tried at Nisi Prius, before Crosswell, J. It was upon a
policy upon the life of the plaintiff's intestate, containing the proviso,
that if the assured should "commit suicide, or die by duelling, or
by the hands of justice, the policy should be void." The assured
died from the effects of sulphuric acid taken by himself, but evidence
was given tending to show, that at the time he took the sulphuric
acid, he was in fact of unsound mind. In his charge to jury, the
learned Judge said, that to bring the case within the exception, it
must be made to appear that the deceased died by his own voluntary act; that at the time he committed that act, he could distinguish between right and wrong, so as to be able to understand and
appreciate the nature and quality of the act he was doing; and that
therefore, he was at that time a responsible being. The jury found
for the plaintiff. 2 Car. and Kirwan, 184. This cause was afterwards brought into the Court of Exchequer Chamber on bill of exception, and will be found in 3 Man. & Gr. 437, by the title of
0lift vs. Bchwabt. That Court, by a vote of four to two, ordered a
new trial, holding that the direction was erroneous; for that the
terms of the condition included all acts of voluntary self-destruction, and therefore, if A voluntarily killed himself, it was immate-
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rial whether he was or was not, at the time a responsible moral
agent.
This case is open to the same remark as Borradale vs. Hunter,
supra. It turned upon the assumed fact, that the act of suicide was
voluntary; a fact not found by the referees in this case.
Judgment affirmed.'
NoTE.-The vote of the Court in the foregoing case stood thus:
For,Affirmation.-Ruggles, Ch. J., Willard, Morse, Mason, Taggart
ForBeversa.7-Gardner,Jewett, Johnson.

Equity Court of Appeals, South Carolina.
SARAH P. DANNER VS. WILIAAM H. TRESCOT.
Conveyance by N. D. to H. F. in trust to have and to hold the premises "unto the
said Hf.F. and his heirs, to the use of the said H. F. and his heirs, in trust nevertheless for the sole, separate and only use of S. D. (wife of the grantor), during the
term of her natural life; so that the same shall in no manner be liable to my
debts, contracts or engagements; and after her death, should the said S. P.-survive me, the said N. D., and only in that event, then in trust to and for the riqht
heirs of her the. said S. D., their heirs and assigns forever." S: D. survived her
husband. Held, that the statute had not executed any of the uses; that the rule
in Shelley's case applied, and that S. D. had an equitable fee.

The following opinion and decree were entered in this -case in
the Court below, at Charleston, by the Chancellor:
This is a bill for the -specific performance of an executory'contract for the sale of a house and 16t in the town of Beaufort. By
a written contract, dated the 29th of April, A. D. 1851, the plaintiff undertook to convey to the defendant the property in question,

IThe

propriety of the decision of Borradale vs. Hunter has been much questioned
in England. See'Bunnyen on Life Ins. 75; note to Dormay vs. Borradale, 5 Comm.
B. 395.-Ens. L. R.
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and to make him good titles; and the latter agreed to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of six thousand dollars, in different instalments,
not necessary here to be particularly brought to notice. The plaintiff avers her readiness to comply with the conditions on her part,
and the defendant having refused to perform, this bill was filed.
The defendant, in his answer, alleges as the ground of his defence
against the prayer of the bill, that the plaintiff is unable to execute
to him good and sufficient titles in fee simple, which, according to
the true construction of the agreement, she was bound to execute.
The plaintiff derived title from her late husband, N. J.Danner,
who, by a deed bearing date the 29th day of April, 1847, conveyed
the lot to Henry Fuller in fee, in trust, however, for uses that are
therein declared, in the following languag : "1To have and to hold
all and singular the premises before mentioned, unto the said Doctor
Henry Fuller, and his heirs; to the use of the said Doctor Henry
Fuller and his heirs; in trust, nevertheless, for the sole, separate
and only use of the said Sarah P. Danner, during the term of her
natural life; so that the same shall in no manner be liable to my
debts, contracts or engagements; and after her death, should the
said Sarah P. Danner survive me, the said N. J. Danner, and only
in that event, then in trust to and for the right heirs of her, the
said Rarah P. Danner, their heirs and assigns forever. But
should I, the said N. J.Danner, survive her, the said Sarah P.
Danner, then in trust, to hold the aforesaid premises to the only
use and behoof of me, the said N. J.Danner, my heirs and assigns,
forever."
The plaintiff has 'survived her husband, N. J. Danner, and in
order to determine whether she is entitled to have a decree against
the defendant for a specific performance of the contract, it will be
necessary to see whether she is now vested with a fee simple estate
in the premises which she has undertaken to convey.
The contingent estate in fee reserved to the husband in the event
of his survivorship, is gone; the condition on which it was to take
effect not havifig happened. It can now never happen, and is not
in the way. So that the deed, as to the question before the Court,
must be construed upon the words giving to Mrs. Danner an" estate
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for life, "and after her death," "to and for the right heirs of her,
the said Sarah P. Danner, their heirs and assigns forever." And
the discussion will more particularly turn upon the effect of the last
words of the preceding sentence, which I have placed in italics.
What effect have these words that are superadded to the previous
words of limitation? Strike them out, and the defendant himself
would admit that the estate to the husband, limited upon his survivorship, having failed, Mrs. Danner would now take the fee under
the rule in Shelly's case. But the defendant insists, that by the
force and effect of the superadded words of limitation, "the right
heirs" of Mrs. Danner will be entitled to take at her death, as purchasers, or in other words, that Mrs. Danner is only entitled to a
life estate, with remainder in fee to her own right heirs.
The reason of this construction rests upon the ground.that the
donor, by indicating an intention to create a new stock of inheritance, the 'ipropositus"of which should be, not Mrs. Danner, but
lier "right heirs," has shown that he did not use the word "heirs"
in its general and technical sense; but to describe a class of persons who should be entitled to take at the death of Mrs. Danner.
I assent to the doctrine, when the subject-matter of the gift ispersonal estate. I assent to it, however, with this qualification: that
the superadded words of limitation-must be after a.giftto the
.of the body or the i8sue, and not after a limitation to one and his
heirs generally. I am aware of no case, English or.American,
where even in reference to personal property, this idea of cutting
down what would otherwise be a fee, by superadded words of limitation, indicating an intent to create a new stock,-has ever been
applied in a case where the gift to the first taker was to him and
his heirs general.
With this qualificationi I think the doctrine well sustained #hen
applicable to personal property. It received an early recognition
in Dott vs. Wilson, 1 Bay, 457. It was affirmed with great solemnity
in Lemacks vs. Glover, 1 Rich. Eq., by the-Court of Errors. Myers
vs. Anderson, 1 Strob. 834, was decided upon its authority. All
these were cases of personal estate.
The first trace of the doctrine that I have been able to find in
-heirs
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the English reports, is that of -Peacockvs. Spooner, and others,
decided by Sir Joseph Jekyll, 4 Geo. 2, and cited by Lord Hardwick, in ifodgson vs. Bussey, 2 Atk. 89. Upon the authority of
Peacock vs. .pooner, and "the general run of the cases," as he
expressed it, (none" of which latter, however, were cited,) Lord
Hardwick decided the case of ifodgson vs. Bussey. In each of
these cases, the property limited was a term for years, which, in
questions of this nature, stand upon precisely the same footing as
chattels personal. See note, 2 Atk. 89. The latter case, (ffodgson vs. Bttssey,) arose under a deed of post-nuptial settlement, by
which, the husband conveyed to trustees a term for fifty-nine years,
in trust, to permit Grace Bussey, his wife, to receive the rents and
profits for her sole and separate use, during the term, if slie should
so long live, and after her decease, to permit Edward Bussey, (who
was the settler,) to enjoy the rents and profits during the remainder
of the term, if he should so long live, and after his decease, in trust
for the heirs of the hodg of Grace, by Edward Bussey begotten,
their heirs, executors and assigns. This case is relied on in the
argument for the defendant, as being in perfect analogy to that
before the Court. But it has several very important contradistinctive features. First, the subject-matter is persoial, and not
real property. Second, the limitation is not to the heirs general,
as in the case of Mrs. Danner, but to the heirs of the body of
Grace Bussey: and, third, the limitation is to even a more limited
class, than to thq heirs of the body of Grace; for it is to the heirs
of her body begotten by Edward Bussey.
As our courts have gone to the English decisions for the authority
and principles upon which Dott vs. Wilson, Lemacks vs. Glover,
4nd similar cases, have been decided, it would be the extreme of
absurdity and inconsistency not to consider the English decisions as
authoritative, when a similar question arises as to real estate.
Jarman (2- Jarm. Wills, 201), lays down the doctrine broadly,
"that where the superadded words amount to a mere repetition of
the preceding* words of limitation, they are, of course, inoperative
to vary the construction." The text is supported by a uniform and
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unbroken series of decisions, down to the case of Nash vs. Nash, 3
Barn. & Adolp. 839, which is directly in point.
The cases go further than this. In Goodright vs. Puvin, Ld.
Raym. 1437, S. C. 2 Strange, 729, the devise was to the first
taker for life, and after his death, to the heirs male of his body,
and their heirs forever; and if he should happen to die without
such male heirs, then over. It was held to be an estate tail in the
first taker. See Buxton vs. Uxbridge, 10 Metcalf, 87. So that it
seems to be well settled, that a limitation to the heirs general of the
heirs of the body is ineffectual to turn the words "heirs of the body"
into words of purchase.
It is said in .argument, that the cage of Doe vs. Ironmonger, 3
East, 535, is contrary to this proposition. It is not so considered
by any English writer. It is true that it is quoted by Chancellor
Harper, in Lemacki vs. Glover, in support of the principle therein
decided, which, as we have seen, related to personal estate. But
that learned Chancellor misconceived the issue decided in Doe vs.
Ironmonger,in applying it to the point involved in Lemacks vs.
Glover. And this is shown by a reference to. the report of the
former case, which I have now before me. The devise (which was
of lands, &c.,) was to Sarah Hallen, &c., and after her death, for
the use of the heirs of her body, lawfflly begotten or to be begotten,
their heirs and assigns forever, without any r~spect to be had or
.made in-regardto seniority of age orpriority-ofbirth." . It is true,
,that the form of the devise was similar to that of the bequest in
Lemacks vs. Clover; but the questions were not the same. It
-was not decided that the heirs-of Sarah Hallen's body took as purchasers, because the testator intended to create a new stock of
inheritance in them.. Hear Lord Ellenborough, who decided the
'cause: He said, "All -Sarah Hallen's children were intenddd to
take together, without regard to seniority of age or priority of
birth; that must mean, that they should take as joint tenants."
This was all that was decided; and the above extract embraces,
according- to the report, every word that fell from his Lordship's
lips. The decision was, that the heirs of the body of Sarah Hallen
took as purchasers, not because the testator intended to create in
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them a new stock of inheritance, but because he intended to give
them an estate in joint tenancy, which was inconsistent with the
devolution of the estate upon them, as tenants in tail.
The only other case quoted by the counsel for the defendant, in
support of his construction of the deed, which I feel incumbent
upon me to notice, is that of MtcClure vs. Young, 8 Rich. Eq. 559,
decided by the Court of Errors. Though there was a division of
the Court in that case, and I myself was among those who dissented,
I acknowledge the authoritative force of the decision, in cases to
which it may be regarded as a precedent. The testator, Jonathan
Davenport, gave all his real estate to his daughter, Catharine, for
and during the term of her natural life; and at her death, he gave
the same absolutely and forever to her lineal descendants. The
decision of the Court was made to rest upon the ground, that the
testator, upon the death of his daughter Catharine, intended to
adopt the provisions of the Act of 1791, as the rule for the distribution of his estate. It was the same (the Court ruled) as if he had
said, on the death of Catharine, the estate shall go, absolutely and
forever, to such persons among her lineal descendants, as under the
Statute of Distribution, would be entitled to take; which, in the
case that happened, was her only child, the defendant. Thus,
according to the reasoning upon which the decision was founded,
the testator had designated, on the death of Catharine, a person or
class of persons, who must then, if ever, be in e8se, and who at that
time, 'were to take an absolute estate. It was the same (reasoned
the Court,) as if Davenport had said in his will, I give the estate to
Catharine, and on her death, I give it to her child or children, to
be equally divided among them, with the right of the representation to the issue of deceased children, &c., the division to take place
among them on the death of Catharine. It is obvious that this
case is strikingly different from that before the Court in all its main
features; as well as in the reasoning by which it was decided.
Certainly, the child of Catharine became a new stock, not taking
his estate derivatively from his mother, but directly as a purchaser
under the will. But that is equally, the case in all limitations of
estates, where the issue or heirs of the body take as purcliasers,
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after a life estate in the ancestor. But that is not what is meant
by the reasoning applicable to a case like that now before the Court.
It is in a case where there being no other circumstances to show
that the testator intended to use the words "heirs of the body," in
another than the technical sense, the argument applies, that
because the testator has given the estate to the heirs of the body
of the first taker, and not content with this, has again limited it to
their heirs, &c., he therefore intended to create a new stock. And
if he- did intend to create a new stock, such new stock would of
course take as purchasers. It is clear that 'the construction of
Davenport's will depended upon no such arguments as this.
The Chancellor who delivered the opinion of the Court, (quoting
from the appeal decree in 'Myers vs. Anderson,) s.ys, "all the
authorities agree, that if the limitation be to the heirs of the body
or issue, and to their heirs, this constitutes them purchasers, as it
shows an iiitention to give them ,an estate not inheritable from
the first taker, but an original estate inheritable from themsplves as a new stock." This proposition is much too broadly
laid down. It is true, when applied to cases involvinbg pergonal
estate, as in MAl
yers vs. Anderson. But it is not correct 'when
applied to real estate, where, as I have shown, the authorities are
all the other way. It is not for me to say why the distinction. has
been drawn:. But I take the law as I find it.
Archer's case, 1 Co. 66, cannot be considered an authority or an
example against this constructioAi. There, lands were devibed to
one for life, and after his death, "to his next heir male, and the
heirs male of the body of such next heir male."
It was held by all the Judges, that the first taker had a life.
estate, with a contingent remainder to "the next heir male." The
testator was considered as.having indicated an intention to use the
words "next heir male," as a description of the person who was
to take after the termination of the life estate-the superadded
words of limitation, converting the exprssion "next heir male,"
into words of purchase; "an effect, however, says Mr. Jarman, 2
vol. Wills, 172, "which, (as will be shown at large in the sequel,)
does not in general, belong to superadded expressions *of this
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nature, and the whole course of the English decisions is in conformity with Mr. Jarman's text.
But to make the most of the general proposition above quoted,
found in Myers vs. Anderson, it is simply this, that "if the limitation be to the heirs of the body, or to the issue and to their heirs,
this constitutes them the'purchasers," &c. But where is the
authority for saying, that such will be the result, if the limitation
be to the heirs-generalof the first taker, and their heirs ?"
Before dismissing Mcolure vs. Young, I have one further
remark to make. I do this with the view of showing the utter
want of analogy between that case and this. In the former, the
gift was to Catharine Davenport for life, and after death to her
" lineal descendants, absolutely and forever," a phrase construed
by the Court to be equivalent to heirs of the body, and evidently
importing issue, while in the case before the Court, the estate is
given to the plaintiff for life, and after her death, to her right
heirs, and their heirs and assigns. There is a vast difference, I
think.
I am of the opinion, that on the death of the husband, and the
survivorship of the wife, the trustee stands seised for the use of the
plaintiff, absolutely and in fee. The estate is conveyed "to Dr.
Henry Fuller and his heirs, in trust, for the use of the said Dr.
Henry Fuller and his heirs, in trust, nevertheless," for the uses and
purposes which the deed proceeds to declare. This is a. trust which
is not executed by the statute of uses. 1 Cruise Dig. 304. Lewin
on Trusts, 102. It will therefore be necessary, in executing a
conveyance, that Dr. Henry Fuller should join. The judgment of the Court is, that there is no valid objection to
the plaintiff's title, so far as the same is derived from the deed of
N. J. Danner.
It is the further judgment of the Court, that if the plaintiff can
show in other respects, a good and sufficient title to the premises,
she is entitled to have a specific performance of the contract set
out in her bill of complaint.
It is further ordered and decreed, that it be referred to one" of
the masters, to report upon the title.
It is further ordered and decreed, that Dr. Henry Fuller, if the
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plaintiff's title should be found good and sufficient, do join in a
conveyance thereof to the defendant.
It is further ordered and decreed, that each party pay his and
her own costs.
GEO. W. DARGAN, OH.
The following were the grounds of appeal :.First. Because

"right heirs," may be

"

designatio personarum,"

or words of purchase as well as "heirs of the body," in grants or
deeds, as well of real as of personal estate.
Second. Because " right heirs," in this deed, should be taken as
words of purchase, from the concurrence of these provisions, first,
an express life estate to Mrs. Danner,-next, a contingent remainder to her "right heirs," and third, the addition of words showing
an intention to make the "right heirs" a new stock of inheritance
or purchasers.
McCrady, for Appellant.
.Petigru and .King, for Appellee.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Chancellor.

Louisville Chancery Court, Kentucky, January, 1854.
JACKSON, OWSLEY & CO., vS. THE ETNA INS. CO.
1. Insurance on "the stock of a pork-house," made in the name of thd owners of
the establishment, includes the pork, &c., of others, which is there on commission,
although in the printed conditions of t4ie policy it is stated that "goods held in
trust or on commission, are to be insured as such, otherwise the policy will not
cover such property."
2. If that condition is substantially complied with, that is sufficient.
8. A contract to soll a part of the pork, the absolute propertyof the owners of the
pork-house, and the weighing off the same, inspected by the inspector of the
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Sendees, separated the property from the stock, and it was no longer included in
the policy, although the vendors were, by a separate contract, to smoke it at the
establishment.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
PIRTLE, CH.-The plaintiffs were owners of apor-iouse and pork
packing establishment in the city of Louisville, and they procured insurance of the defendants Cagainst loss or damage by fire, to the amount
of five thousand dollars, on pork, lard, bacon, bulkmeat, hogs hanging,
or otherwise, salt barrels, kegs, and all other articles composing the
stock of a pork-house, contained in their pork-packing, lard and
smoke-houses." In the printed conditions referred to in the policy,
it is stated that "goods held in trust or on commission are to be
insured as such, otherwise the policy will not cover such property."
"Goods on storage must be separately and specifically insured."
The plaintiffs had a large quantity of their own pork, &c., in the
establishi-ent, and a larger quantity belonging to other persons,
acked from hogs killed by them, and held on commission, or for
others on consignment. There was also insurance by other underwriters, against fire, on the stock; $25,000 in the name of Jackson,
Owsley & Co., and $35,000 in their name, "or whom it may
concern." The policy sued on provides for abatement or contribution in case of other insurance.
A loss by fire happened to the amount of $56,514 -%%; of this
amount $36,573 '10 was on commission, or consignment; and it is
contended that about $18,000 of the residue of the loss was on pork
that had been sold to Harbinson & Hausborough.
It appears in proof, that a great part of the work done at these
pork-packing establishments, is for other persons besides the owners
of the pork-houses, &c.; and that a large quantity of the pork, &c.,
that is on hand is the property of other persons; that the term
"pork-house," in Louisville, means a house where pork is received
and packed for others on commission, as well as for the proprietors.
It also appears that these other persons generally instructed Jackson, Owsley, & Co., to have their-property in the pork-house insured
against fire, and that the plaintiffs hQld themselves bound to have
all the property they held in the establishment insured.
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The defendants contend that they are not bound to contribute
any thing in regard to the loss on the property of which the plaintiffs were not the absolute owners.
The pork trade is very extensive in the Western States, and this
question of insurance is one of great fiaportance, but I think it can
I
be disposed of in a few words.
It is not denied that they would be liable for the property on
commission, &c., if the expression 'or for whom it may concern"
were contained in this policy. But such an expression would not
be a literal compliance with the printed condition in regard to such
goods. Is a literal compliance necessary?
The intention of such a condition is, to be sure as to the extent
of the contract; to have that only insured for which a premium is
paid, and not to have one man's policy upon goods strictly his own,
cover another man's goods, who should take from the underwriter a
separate policy, and pay.another premium. Wherever these objects
are attained, where the goods are substantially described, it does
not matter that they are not called "goods on commission."
The insurance here is "on pork, lard, bacon,.&c., anid all other
articles composing the stock of a pork-house." Now, the "stock
of a pork-house" in Louisville, includes pork in said house that belongs to other people, and is held by the owners of the house on
commission, which is of hogs sent to them, and which they have
killed and packed, and for which they have charges and a special
property. The terms of the poliby are therefore complied with.
And if there was any thing in the writing that did not correspond
with the printing, the printing should give way to the writing.
There is a good deal of proof that Insurance Companies in Louisville
regard themselves as bound by such terms as are used in this policy,
for the property held on commission; but there is no proof of 'an
adjustment of a loss under such a policy, and I do not regard such
evidence as making out a usage, but decide this point on the written
words of the policy as quoted. In the case of the _Franklia Fire
Afls. Co., of Piadelphiavs. Rewitt, Allison & Co., 3 B. Monroe,
231, the Court decided that insurance on "their stock of merchandise, generally contained in their three story brick buildings, occu-
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pied by them as a commission house," included goods on commission.
The policy itself, by the very words of the condition, contemplates
that the plaintiffs had a right to make insurance in their own names
on the goods of others which they held in trust, or on commission.
And, indeed, I suppose this mode of making insurance has not been
doubted in this country since the elaborate judgment in the case of
Do Forest vs. FuZton Ins. Co., 1 Hall's Reports.
This mode of miking up the policy is especially important in the
insurance of pork and lard put up for others in a pork-house.
We have a very fluctuating climate; it shifts from cold to warm
very suddenly in the season for pork-packing, and the hogs must be
killed by thousands in a day, when the weather will permit. It is,
too, in a manner impossible to comply literally with the conditions
recited in this policy. The owners of the pork-house cannot tell
for an hour what they have on commission. But Jackson, Owsley
& Co., had agreed to sell to Harbinson & Hansborough forty thou-

sand shoulders of pork.

This was to be paid for in cash.

No par-

ticular prices were mentioned in the bargain, but a large quantity

had been weighed off for them, and inspected by their own inspector;
$17,000 of the purchase money had been paid, and flar'binson says
in his deposition, that he "considered the pork in the process of
delivery at the time the money was paid." This, however, would not
be conclusive, because he was not present. His partner "had come

down to see to the weighing of the pork, and while here he paid the
money."

There was nothing futher to be done on the part of the

vendors after the pork was weighed. The witness, their clerk, says
the property was theirs until it was paid for, and that they were
bound to keep it insured; but these are deductions of his, for on
cross-examination he can state no facts to sustain these positions.
It is a doctrine of the Civil Law, as well as of the Common Law,
that "when the terms of a sale are agreed on, and the bargain is
struck, and every thing the seller has to do with the goods is complete, the contiact of sale becomes absolute as between the parties,
without payment or delivery, and the. property and the risk of accident to the goods vest in the buyer." Inst. lib. 3, tit. 24, sect. 3;
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2 Kent's Com. 492; Smith's Mercantile Law, 481, 482; Ruggs
vs. Minnett, 11 East. 210; Willis vs. Willis, 6 Dana, 48; Crawford vs. Smith, 7 Dana, 59.
I suppose there would have been no difficulty, if these goods had
not been paid for in convenient time, in sustaining an action
against Harbinson & Hansborough for goods sold; and this, I think,
is a very good test as to the change of property. I know it may be
different by the agreement of the parties, but there is no agreement
or understanding of that kind proved here.
It is true, this pork was to be smoked at the establishment of the
plaintiffs, but this was by a different contract from the purchase,
and it was t6 be. paid for separately. It was found that the forty
thousand shoulders in bulk-meat, could not be furnished, and it was
agreed that a quantity which was then smoking, should be put in,
to makp up the amount.purchased. This pork was in the process
of smoking When the fire took place, and, of course, it perished the
property.of the vendors, if it perished at all.
As to the pork that had been weighed and set apart, it was no
longer a part of the stock of the pork-house, and. was niot included
in the policy, any more than any other property sold at the porkhouse and casually left there. That there was a right to hold it
in possession until paid for in full, can make no difference; nor can
it continue as a part of the stock because it was contemplatedato be
smoked there. -No smoking had commenced, and the vendees had
the power to withdraw their property at any time. It was ndt
stock like that killed and packed by the owners of the pork-house,
which could not be withdrawn at the pleasure of the consignors
merely, as in that there was a special property, and all accounts
had to be adjusted and paid, and then the articles designated and
yielded to the consignors-before they could take.
The master is ordered to make up the adjustment and contribution according to the foregoing opinion.
.Bipleyand Logan, for Plaintiffs.
Wolfe and Caldwell, for Defendants.

